Surprisingly, the greatest weaknesses are in the domain of their most commonly assigned mission: crime fighting. The current dominant strategy of policing relies on three principal operational methods to control crime. The first is patrol (random or targeted), designed to deter crime and intercept criminal acts in progress. The second is rapid responses to calls for service. The third is retrospective investigation of criminal offenses. The first two functions are generally carried out by a uniformed patrol force that typically comprises 60 to 70 percent of a police department. The patrol force is linked to citizens through an elaborate network of telephones, dispatchers, and radios. The third function is usually performed by a detective bureau that comprises 10 to 15 percent of the force. The detectives are aided in the solution of crimes by their own extensive experience with criminal offenders, by elaborate files of previous cases and recidivists, by forensic laboratories, and by a variety of standard investigative methods.
Although this apparatus is extremely impressive in its operations, and although great progress has been made in deterring and solving crimes, there are reasons to believe that this strategy is not nearly as effective in controlling crime as once believed. Experiments have revealed that motorized patrol neither prevents crime nor reassures citizens. Varying the levels of patrol in communities by a factor of two, results in no changes in levels of crime or in levels of fear.
Research has also cast doubt on the efficacy of rapid response to calls for service. The problem is not that offenders flee before the police can arrive at the scene. In most cities, the police are about five minutes from any point in an emergency situation. However, victims and witnesses do not call the police while the crime is occurring, or even shortly after. Many offenses are not noticed by witnesses; many witnesses decide not to become involved. And after an attack, when the victim has the first opportunity to alert the police, his or her first call is usually to someone else-a relative, a friend, or an advisor. As a result, a fast response time is wasted. As the police often put it, they arrive in time to hold the hand of the victim-a task they resent since it keeps them from apprehending the victimizer.
Finally, studies of retrospective investigation of crimes reveal that most cases are solved, not by deduction, or physical evidence, or informants, but by very specific identifications of the offender by the victim or witnesses. This reflects the fact that many times criminal and victim know each other; it also leads to the sad conclusion that little is known about how to solve crimes that happen between strangers.
In sum, the principal techniques relied on by the police to deal with their primary objective seem surprisingly ineffective. Moreover, it is by no means clear that more resources would help. Additional money (in the form of more police on the street) or additional power to search does not obviously improve police performance. The far more valuable resource seems to be an effective partnership with the community to ensure that what the community knows will be available to the police. But the police cannot command that; they must earn it by working to create trust and confidence between themselves and the community. Their current techniques do not approach this goal. There may be some promising alternatives, but they are so far largely untested.
Police capabilities in other domains seem stronger. The police do seem able to still citizens' fears by being regularly available on a face-to-face basis. They do seem able to promote order by using their authority to regulate disorderly and disruptive conduct on the street. They do routinely provide emergency medical services because their training equips them for the task. In the area of crime prevention, the police are also beginning to make progress, but often at the expense of their traditional methods. One new approach is called "problem solving." To illustrate, let us suppose the police discover that truant teenagers are behind a rash of daytime burglaries in a particular area. More effective enforcement of truancy laws ends the problem, but the department is accused of spending an inordinate amount of time on minor offenses like truancy.
A far more difficult domain is emergency social services. The police have little patience for problems that cannot be solved by an arrest and little training or knowledge that equips them to respond in some way other than through arrests. They do not want to become social workers. And even if their responsibilities are limited to emergencies and they are not required to sustain a relationship with the people or the situations that keep producing the emergencies, they still are not comfortable with this mission. The police are constantly drawn into these problems; they often contribute by resolving the dispute; and they could contribute more through referrals. Yet this awareness does not budge them from their basic distrust of such services. It is true, of course, that the police alone cannot actually solve these problems. At best, they can provide "trauma care" and "referrals" to those who can treat the underlying troubles.
So, there is a mismatch between police operational inclinations and capabilities on the one hand and the police mission on the other. In areas that they and the society regard as essential, their capabilities are strikingly limited. In areas that are potentially important but underemphasized, their capabilities are stronger.
