Executive Competence
Except in a few places-Florida, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and New York City, for instance-there appears to be little or no attention paid to the appropriateness (as opposed to the expediency) of appointments to social welfare executive positions in state and municipal government. It is doubtful whether the routine application of ordinary patronage criteria will produce any more than accidentally qualified executives. Unusually good performance in these complex and demanding jobs-measured by program performance and the creation of political equity, not simply by longevity in office or the suppression of political conflict-is likely to be a product of some combination of entrepreneurial qualities: a forceful intellect, a high level of energy, exceptional political acumen, imagination and creativity, and strength of character. All public executive positions would benefit from unusual talent, of course, but contributing in a positive and lasting way to the controversial, value-laden, and complex issues associated with social welfare administration virtually requires it.
Consideration of the characteristic demands and problems facing social welfare executives suggests that, differences in context notwithstanding, the more effective ones will tend to be intuitive, "right-brain" types: flexible, optimistic, thematic, and persuasive more than systematic, thorough, and realistic; more clever than smart; warm rather than cool; more convincing than convinced. Executives who are more inner-directed, process-oriented, ideological, or narrowly specialized (and this group includes many who become candidates for human-service appointments owing to their professional credentials) will probably have greater difficulty coping with the ambiguity, indeterminacy, and conflict associated with social program administration than executives who are outgoing, imaginative, and pragmatic.
Organizational Design
But what of the service delivery issues? What of the quality and competence of administration? Surely these matters should not be neglected. Without doubt the structure of an organization and of the incentives facing its officials affects its performance, and the structure of interorganizational relations (for example, the relations between federal, state, and local human-service agencies) influences the performance of the entire social service system. But the question is, is it time well spent for an executive to emphasize organization design and improvement of program performance through structural measures?
Analysis of the problems of social program administration strongly discourages a search for organizational designs and incentives that will produce efficient results without close and time-consuming monitoring of subordinate behavior-that is, for a "hidden managerial hand," or a set of rules and incentives that harmonizes conflicting interests and moves the organization toward the efficient supply of collective goods. Such a search may not be worth the cost in terms of attention diverted from more entrepreneurial, equity-building activities.
The tensions between the self-interests of legislators, program administrators, direct service workers of varying professional orientations, and clients, on the one hand, and organizational interests, on the other, cannot be overcome solely or even primarily by structural measures. Attempts to eliminate one set of bureaucratic problems may well create new ones that escape detection.42 Attempts to disentangle the overlapping incentives inherent in the federal system of social program administration and closely monitor the consequences can be exhausting and ultimately fruitless.
On these grounds and all other factors being equal, executive resources would appear to be better deployed on the demand side: in creating political equity in social programs. By virtue of their positions in the political system, social welfare executives have natural advantages in exerting influence at the middle levels of power to secure support for programs and to shape the programmatic directions of policy. They are in a position to have a comprehensive view of their departments, to gather information, and to identify strategic opportunities, since they know more about external politics than lower-level officials and more about their department's internal dynamics than legislators or the governor. They have sufficient control over information and budgetary and human resources to allocate them to advantage.
The crux of the most reasonable approach to the structural problems facing social welfare executives-whether they arise on the demand or supply sides of social service provision-is to resist viewing effective executive performance as dependent on making technically rational decisions on each program design issue. Rather, executive decision-making should be regarded as a process with broadly strategic consequences: a series of opportunities to build a reputation for trustworthiness that will lead to cooperation and more efficient results.
Managers should look at their organizations as being composed of individuals with diverse interests who will inevitably find themselves in conflict on occasion. Their best response to this problem is to inspire among their own employees a willingness to cooperate and trust each other by setting an example of being concerned and trustworthy themselves. . . . Managers who can induce norms of cooperation and trust among employees can realize more of the gains from team production than can managers who rely on formal incentive systems only.
In practical terms, a successful strategy for managing social services will include an emphasis on positive rewards, recognition, and publicity; measures to instill pride and motivate efforts; premises for action that can be easily grasped and that reflect widely understood values; an absence of defensiveness and a willingness to investigate and publicize mistakes; loyalty to employees, political allies, and anyone who assists in promoting executive goals; occasional support for other political actors whose goodwill and power may be helpful; believable arguments and reliable data; and the appearance of intelligently conceived movement and change.
Whether the end in view is inducing able-bodied welfare recipients to work, protecting children from neglect and abuse, enhancing the dignity and independence of the impaired elderly, improving the life prospects of infants in high-risk environments, or sheltering the homeless, leadership that is hopeful, outward-looking, flexible and understandable has the best chance of making a positive difference.
