Focal concerns and conflicts about them develop and change in cycles, partly because of the impact of vivid events in recent memory. John Dilulio, Jr., estimates that legislative attention to prisons has shifted every few years from one to the other of punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence, and security. The focus changes as dramatic, visible incidents throw doubt on prior policies or actions and imply the need to reallocate community resources to manage the perceived underlying causes of the dramatic incidents-often the policies or actions of the commissioner. Commissioners with multiple, conflicting constituencies are constantly vulnerable to a change of focal concern that draws the energy and resources of the coalitions of constituencies away from professional priorities-as in Dilulio's corrections commissioners and their external "coaches, customers, and critics."
Conflicting focal concerns can also stimulate the formation of coalitions. New temporary coalitions sometimes form with the single aim of acting on the focal concern. Sometimes already well-established groups-for example, legislatures-alter their focal concerns and therefore their coalitions. The new coalitions find themselves in contention with other groups, established and new, that have incompatible focal concerns. The very act of engaging the opposition and negotiating some resolution of the conflict intensifies the focal concern, clarifies the identity and the solidarity of the coalitions, sharpens their boundaries, and crystallizes their social norms. Rules (or norms) of cooperation within the coalition and rules of the tactics of opposing other groups become more clear and consensual and sometimes more savage. Thus groups may create issues and issues may create groups, but both the issue and the group strengthen in identity and focus during encounters with opposing groups.
Conflict can thereby stabilize the power structure of a commissioner's constituencies, or it can change that structure. This process is well illustrated by the history of farmers' groups in the United States from the period after the Civil War until the present. The lineage begins with the limited and unstable American Farmers' Alliance whose mission was to protect farmers from horse thieves and unscrupulous land speculators, and ends with the modern, very large and stable Department of Agriculture, which is now both a commission and an advocacy group.
The social power of any contending constituency is likely to be at least somewhat unstable and ambiguous, especially in domains guided by weak myths. Active contention with opposing constituencies provides an excellent assessment of the relative social power of the groups, which is another important function of conflict among constituencies. The newly formed patients' advocacy group may try to prevail in the belief that the trying will reveal how much power it has. That clarification and specification of relative social power permits, although it does not ensure, the realignment of coalitions toward a balance of power among the contending constituencies. The process also positions the commissioner, strong or weak, in the power structure of the constituencies. Mark Moore provides dramatic example: the test of the political power of Police Chief Kevin Tucker of Philadelphia when he opposed Frank Rizzo in his last race for mayor- and Rizzo lost.
The public and those who must allocate resources accept a greater level of intensity in the pursuit of supra-personal, altruistic missions than in the pursuit of very egoistic or special interests. In temporary coalitions seeking special interests, the alliances shift readily as issues change, and the contention is a matter of competitive bargaining for pragmatic benefits, not a crusade for fundamental rights to scarce community resources. Accordingly, a commissioner finds that coping with such mild conflict and changing coalitions is altogether a possible job.
On the other hand, when the constituencies are well established, the coalitions long-standing, the guiding myths weak, and the mission altruistic, the conflicts become intense and polarized. Witness the "right to life" and "women's choice" groups, formed of constituencies with a deep emotional investment in their version of fundamental human rights. The commissioner is trapped among the intensely clashing demands so that almost any action will antagonize an established and powerful coalition of constituencies. The job becomes impossible.
As pointed out previously, the combination of the first two dimensions of difficulty defines impossibility more clearly than does either one alone. Some commissioners serve a legitimate clientele, such as farmers, with a few constituencies in mild conflict over egoistic special interests. Their jobs are quite possible. At the opposite pole, some commissioners serve an illegitimate clientele with multiple, conflicting constituencies, such as the seriously mentally ill. If the contention among constituencies produces a flexible pattern of coalitions, which changes readily to balance the power allocation, the commissioner has options. He or she can judiciously join or support coalitions acting in his or her interest, or stay aloof and tip the balance in his or her favor. If, however, the contention among constituencies is marked by conflicting, altruistic, human rights declarations and produces a rigidly polarized, moralistic fight, the commissioner is trapped. To satisfy one constituency is to frustrate another. To take no action is to frustrate all of them. The conflict is a no-win situation.
In summary, the legitimacy of the clients and the polarization of the struggle among constituencies are dimensions of difficulty that, taken in combination, create some conditions, such as deserving clients and constituencies in mild egoistic conflict that make a commissioner's job quite possible. These dimensions also characterize some conditions, such as illegitimate clients and polarized constituencies that make the job quite impossible.
